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It is widely expected that the Conservatives will outspend their opponents in the election campaign,
including the amounts spent on individual constituency contests. But which of their local parties are
attracting most in donations? Analyses of recently-released data on donations for the whole of
2014 by Ron Johnston, Charles Pattie and David Cutts suggest that the Tories narrowed their
focus to ensure that they retained control of the marginal seats they won in 2010 and attracted
much less for their campaigns to win marginal seats held by the Liberal Democrats and Labour – a
strategy that clearly contrasted with Labour’s goal of increasing its number of MPs.
The Electoral Commission’s recent publication of all substantial donations to the political parties
during the final quarter of 2014 confirmed what most commentators believed: the Conservatives
were raising much more money than their opponents. In the first three quarters of 2014, for
example, their reported donations (in cash or kind) totalled £20.8million, with a further £8.4million
in the final quarter. But where was the money going, and does any change in its direction over the
year indicate alterations in the party’s strategy?
The Conservatives announced in 2012 that their local campaigning would focus on 80
constituencies – 40 lost in 2010 by the smallest margins and the comparable 40 won then. Holding
on to the latter and winning the former should deliver an overall majority. During 2014, its
constituency parties received donations totalling £3.8million, 35% of it during the final quarter. But
only 13% went to local parties in the 40 marginal seats lost in 2010, and 19% to the 40 marginals
won then; over two-thirds of all money donated went to local parties outside that central band of 80
marginal seats.
The first diagram shows the amounts donated to all 631 constituency parties in Great Britain (i.e. excluding
Buckingham, held by the Speaker). The seats are grouped according to whether they were won or lost in 2010, in 5
percentage-point marginal bands. The first five categories – on the left – comprise seats lost (‘Hopeless’ – by over
20 percentage points – to ‘Winnable’ – lost by 5 points or less): the other five – on the right – are those won.
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Of the seats lost in 2010, very little was
donated to the first three categories, where
victory in 2015 is very unlikely; about £400,000
each went to the other two categories –
‘Possible’ and ‘Winnable’ seats. Much more
was donated to local parties in marginal seats
won in 2010, although of the c.£600,000
received in the first three quarters to ‘Easily
Lost’ constituency parties, £206,325 went to
just one – Watford (with a further £31,735 in
the final quarter): Watford is one of the few
three-way marginal seats and the Liberal
Democrats’ candidate is the popular local
mayor. More surprising is that 25% of all
money donated went to local parties in ‘Very
Safe’ seats. This was as much as was raised
in the marginal constituencies the party
needed to win from Labour or the Liberal
Democrats if it was to form a majority
government in 2015. Donors seem happier to support candidates unlikely to lose than those seeking to overthrow an
opponent!
Was there a change in strategy during 2014? There were media suggestions that the Conservatives decided to
focus increasingly on defending the seats held – partly responding to UKIP’s threat, which could facilitate Labour
victories there. In the first three quarters, 23% of the donations by value went to the ‘Easily Lost’ constituency parties
and 15% to those in the ‘Possible Loss’ category. In the final quarter, the respective percentages were 14 and 22 –
suggesting that the party might even have given up on some of its most losable seats and instead pressed donors to
favour those won by majorities of 5-10 points. This shift is even more marked if we exclude the large donations to
Watford: without them, in the first three quarters the ‘Easily Lost’ and ‘Possible Loss’ local parties each obtained 16%
of all donated money; in the final quarter their respective shares were 12 and 23%.
In the marginal seats where the Tories lost in 2010 more money was donated to local parties where the Liberal
Democrats won than in those held by Labour – given their coalition partner’s position in the polls, their seats were
seen as better prospects than were those held by Labour. In the marginal seats being defended by the Tories,
however, they raised more in donations where Labour came second in 2010 and were providing the main challenge
in 2015 – there are few, if any, seats where Liberal Democrat candidates are a threat to Tory incumbents (Watford is
an obvious exception!).
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How does this pattern of Conservative money-
raising through donations compare with the
other parties’? The second graph compares
money donated to Conservative and Labour
local parties. The Conservatives raised much
more – nearly £1million in their ‘Very Safe’
seats alone, compared to just over £200,000
for Labour in its ‘Very Safe’ seats. Labour’s
money-raising was much more focused on
seats where it lost in 2010. This is clarified by
the third graph, which shows the distributions
as percentages of the total money received by
local parties during the year. Over half of the
money donated to Labour local parties went to
constituencies lost in 2010, compared to less
than one-quarter of all Conservative donations
going to their comparable seats; the
Conservatives raised more than that for their
‘Very Safe’ seats.
Although the Liberal Democrats have a
network of constituency parties across much of
Britain, in London and some major urban
centres they are organised by local authorities,
each containing two or more seats. Including
the latter, they received £2.3million in 2014:
£1.4million went to individual constituency
parties, £1million to 31 with incumbent MPs
and a further £223,000 to 13 which would be
considered reasonable targets in a ‘normal
election’ – where the Liberal Democrats were
less than 5 percentage points behind the 2010
victor. In addition, £935,500 was donated to 40
larger units, 12 of which included a seat with a
Liberal Democrat incumbent (they received
£641,978) and a further 11 included ‘target’
seats (which received £163,615). Of the total
income from donations to local parties, 71%
went towards defending seats: not surprisingly,
Liberal Democrats were concentrating on hanging on to what they already held.
The Greens received £724,765 in 2014, of which £591,000 went to the central organisation and the remainder to
regional or borough party units. Twenty-one UKIP constituency parties received £184,293; in addition, nine groups
of two or more constituencies and eleven regional groupings received £32,650 and £164,296 respectively. The bulk
of UKIP’s donations – £3,838,024 – went to the national party, however. The SNP received £4.1million during 2014,
probably for the independence referendum campaign (almost all of the donations were received before the end of
September): only six donations were to local parties. Finally only one Plaid Cymru constituency party received
donations in 2014 – £124,585 to the Ynys Mon unit from the same individual: apart from its Short Money, the central
party organisation received only £60,000.
In total, some £10million was donated to local parties in 2014. The Conservatives raised most, increasingly focused
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on the seats they were defending, including very substantial sums to local parties where defeat was extremely
unlikely. Unless the pattern of donations was at odds with the party’s strategy (i.e. it was unable to solicit funds
where it needed them most) this suggests that – like the Liberal Democrats – they decided to concentrate on
retaining as many of their seats as possible rather than campaign hard to increase their complement of MPs.
Labour, meanwhile, was more aggressive; it raised less money for local campaigns than the Conservatives, but
more of it was being directed to seats lost in 2010 but where it hopes to win this time.
Money, of course, is a necessary component of all local campaigns – needed for leaflets, posters etc. – but large
donations are not sufficient to ensure success (and, of course, candidates in safe seats need some to underpin their
– perhaps lower-key – campaigns). Some donors may prefer to give money to support known incumbents than to
help fund potential gains elsewhere – and it may be that Labour is better at suggesting where its major donors send
their money: 51% of Conservative donations to local parties by value came from individuals compared to 31% for
Labour, whose local parties got 26% of their money in 2014 from trades unions. Some – many? – local parties may
be unable to attract money in large donations but can finance their campaigns through smaller sums plus other fund-
raising activities, and where there are shortfalls in the amount available locally these may be compensated by
campaigning organised and funded from national and regional offices.
Nevertheless, the pattern of large donations to constituencies in 2014 provides some intriguing insights to the
parties’ campaigning strategies: have the Tories really pulled back from a hard push to win 40 more seats – or is the
money rolling in now to sustain a last minute push there?
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